XXI.   An Aspect of Delivery in Ancient Rhetorical Theory

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In John Bulwer's *Chirologia* and *Chironomia*,[1] the fullest account of rhetorical delivery written in England during the Renaissance, there appear some unusual statements about delivery which are not found as commonplaces in the other rhetorical writings of the period.[2]   I shall quote these statements because they anticipate the conclusion of this paper and because they make one begin to wonder what sort of precedent they have in the ancient period when the theories of delivery that are Bulwer's ultimate sources were being developed.   Writing on the relationship of what he calls the "language" of delivery to that of words per se, Bulwer says, "The Speech and Gesture are conceived together in the mind," and again on the same subject, "The gestures of the *Hand* must be prepar'd in the Mind, together with the inward speech, that precedes the outward expression."[3]   The basic conception which supplies a context for these statements is the ancient view of delivery as *mentis index*.   This involves the principle that rhetorical delivery to be effective must be sustained by impulses of "natural" emotion; i.e., the expressions of the voice and the body must seem unfeigned, sincere and appropriate, as direct signals from the center of thought and emotion in the mind; the purpose of training in the art of delivery is to perfect the natural ability to express these signals; *natura* and *ars* overlap one another just as the gestures and inflections of conversation or "private" speech are similar and

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[1] John Bulwer, *Chirologia: or the Naturall Language of the Hand. Composed of the Speaking Motions, and Discoursing Gestures thereof. Whereunto is added Chironomia: or the Art of Manuall Rhetoricke. Consisting of the Naturall Expressions, Digested by Art in the Hand, as the Chiefest Instrument of Eloquence. (London 1644.)   Part 1, *Chirologia* and part 2, *Chironomia*, were issued together with the same title page. "Digested" here means "reduced to order."   Bulwer's view descends from the ancient conception of delivery as *natura ab arte perfecta*.   See below, pages 267–68 and 270, and notes 27 and 34.

[2] B. L. Joseph, *Elizabethan Acting* (Oxford 1951) 29.

[3] Bulwer (above, note 1) *Chirol.*, 4.   *Chiron.* 142.   Cf. Quint. *Inst. orat.* 11.3.62 on the voice as *mentis index*, and 11.3.65 on gesture: "animo cum ea (voce) simul paret."

often identical to those of public speech. The chief criticism of most of the rules for delivery in ancient rhetoric is directed to their prescriptive nature—as against (the rule of) spontaneity. In this way the classical tradition provides a retort to such criticism. Bulwer's *Chirologia*—on the "naturall," conversational gestures— serves as a necessary foundation for his *Chironomia*, the "naturall expressions" perfected by art.[3a]   In the quoted statements, how- ever, Bulwer seems not only to embrace this principle but also to imply that the desired effect of delivery could be ensured in the process of composing the speech. "It appears . . . that not only the sound, but also the gestures, could be imagined at the same moment when thoughts were turned into language in the mind." [4] Moreover, Bulwer represents rhetorical delivery as a language whose expressions are as capable of definition as printed words. The numerous plates which he uses to illustrate gestures are a kind of dictionary. When Bulwer's Renaissance orator composed a speech, a language of delivery seems to have been involved directly in his labors of writing in the same way as the language of words, both of which were to be expressed together in the spoken perfor- mance. As to whether the ancient orators composed in this way, common sense without the aid of scholarship might tell us that authors such as Demosthenes or Cicero probably consulted their sense of effective delivery and imagined gestures, facial expressions, tones of voice under the same impulses that inspired suitable words. Moreover, since ancient literature as a whole is in its nature and origin an oral literature, we might suppose it to be true that the ancient orators suited "the action to the word, the word to the action," not merely in delivering a speech but especially in composing it. The purpose of this paper, however, is to discuss the evidence as to whether this method of composition was assumed or even advocated in ancient rhetorical theory.

Does Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* so include delivery within the art and the actual process of literary composition? In the *Poetics* he

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[3a] The title page of Bulwer's work (above, note 1) indicates his view of *natura* and *ars*. Cf. *ibid. Chirol.*, 4 f. The principle of *natura ab arte perfecta* shows a vigorous continuation in rhetorical instruction in this country. See J. A. Winans, *Public Speaking* (New York 1923) 20–49, 468–473; cf. W. M. Parrish, "Whatley on Elocu- tion," *The Rhetorical Idiom* (Ithaca 1958, ed. D. C. Bryant) 43–52; R. H. Wagner "Conversational Quality in Delivery," *Speech Training and Public Speaking for Secondary Schools* (New York and London 1925, ed. A. M. Drummond) 52–62.

[4] Joseph (above, note 2) 29.

makes a conspicuous point of excluding the actor's art[5] as a separate art from that of the tragic poet.[6]   In Aristotle's day the tragic poets no longer were accustomed to perform their own plays (*Rhet*. 1403B23–24).   The orator, however, combined in a certain way both the making and the performing of the speech in his art. Aristotle in his somewhat revolutionary book on rhetoric establishes delivery as one of the elements of the art of rhetoric as a whole.   Aristotle's method of analyzing the components of rhetoric differs greatly from that of his predecessors.   They had arranged the rhetorical material under chapters which corresponded to the *partes orationis* (*exordium*, *narratio*, etc.) and had discussed the rhetorical techniques that could be employed in each "part" of a speech.   Aristotle on the other hand analyzed the individual components of a speech which pervade it throughout, the elements common to all the "parts" of a speech.   These elements are the *erga* (*officia*) or "functions" of rhetoric.[7]   He considers delivery as one of these along with invention, arrangement and style.   Even with regard to the orator, however, as opposed to the actor, it may be asked whether delivery is vitally involved in the composing of a speech, or if delivery is merely something which is added in a superficial way in the performance after the artistic labors of composition have been completed. Aristotle does not give the same kind of prominence to the element of delivery in the structure of the rhetorical art as he gives to invention, arrangement and style.   These form the three main

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[5] Some actors according to Aristotle performed *dia technês*, and others *dia synêtheias* (1447A20).   The latter is similar to the Platonic term *empeiria*; cf. Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford 1909) 102.   On the other hand Aristotle polemicizes against Plato to some extent in claiming delivery as a *technê*; see Plato, *Rep*. 3.395E–396B, 397A; Arist. *Poet* 1447A18–24; and cf. Gerald Else, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1957) 20–1.

[6] He does so most expressly in 1461B26–62A14 where he defends the tragic form of imitation against the charge that it is inferior to the epic form because the tragic actors exaggerate their gestures for the crowd; cf. Else (above, note 5) 640–42.   See Else also, *ibid*. 24, note 91, for references to passages from other works of Aristotle showing that he thought of the *phônê*, the chief medium of the actor, as the mere carrier of the *logos*, the medium of the poet.

[7] See Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJP* 62 (1941) 35–50, 169–90.   Cf. Aristotle's similar treatment of the art of poetry in the *Poetics* 1447A8–18, and see Solmsen, "The Origin and Methods of Aristotle's Poetics," *CQ* 29 (1935) 192–201; Else (above, note 5) 3–16.   Both the pre-Aristotelian and the Aristotelian methods of rhetorical analysis persisted in later manuals on rhetoric; these are classified by Karl Barwick, "Die Gliederung der rhetorischen TEXNH und die horazische *Epistula ad Pisones*," *Hermes* 57 (1922) 1 ff.

divisions, but he includes delivery within his discussion of style. Although he treats delivery quite briefly, one is able to see its relationship to style. He says:

> Our next subject will concern style. It is not enough to know what to say, but one must also know how to say it (*hôs dei eipein*) ... Following the natural order we first investigated ... subject matter as a source of persuasion; second comes the question of style with which the subject is set out; the third division is ... delivery (*Rhet.* 1403B15–22).

From this we may abstract Aristotle's *diaeresis* according to which style and delivery are the two divisions of the "how" to speak.[8] Moreover, he assumes that there would have been no technical concern for delivery unless the matter of style had come into consideration first (1403B35 f.). He also considers delivery a matter of natural talent[9] and quite independent of *technê* unless it is involved with style περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον (1404A15 f.).

The relationship of style and delivery can be seen more clearly in Aristotle's discussion of the *lexis graphikê* and the *lexis agônistikê* in *Rhet.* 1413B3–1414A20. Plato in his *Phaedrus* had proposed some requirements to be met by anyone attempting a serious treatment of rhetoric. Among other things he will "classify the different kinds of speech and kinds of soul according to type and emotional affinities and go through all the causes involved; he will match the different types with one another and show what kind of speech must effect persuasion in a particular kind of soul but not in another and for what reason."[10] Plato apparently

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[8] Cf. Quo modo ... dicatur id est in duobus: in agendo et in eloquendo (Cic. *Orat.* 55).

[9] *esti physeôs*; cf. above, note 5.

[10] Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ ... διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δίεισι πάσας αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ. (Phaedrus 271A f.). It is possible that the introductory sentence of Aristotle's discussion may be intended to echo the above passage: Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἑκάστῳ γένει ἁρμόττει λέξις (*Rhet.* 1413B3 f.). It is also possible that the three verbal correspondences may be mere coincidence since Aristotle does not mean γένει ψυχῆς τε καὶ λόγων but only γένει λόγων. He had already dealt with the requirement concerning the *psychê* in the famous passage on *êthos* and *pathos* in *Rhet.* 1378A ff ; see below, page 267. On this point and on the influence of Plato's *Phaedrus* upon Aristotle's treatment of *pathos* see the "appendix" in Solmsen, "The Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," *CP* 33 (1938) 402–4. For a bibliography concerning the well-known points of contact between the *Phaedrus* and the *Rhetoric* see *ibid.* 402, note 38; cf. W. Rhys Roberts, "References to Plato in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *CP* 19 (1924) 342–46.

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wanted the rhetorician to classify both the qualities of the soul and the qualities of the speech so as to compare soul and speech according to mutual compatibilities.   In the famous passage on the emotions Aristotle says that the speech should create the conditions under which men feel particular emotions (1380A2 f.), but he does not list the correspondences between the emotions in the soul and the types of speech.   He discusses the types of speech separately from the analysis of the emotions.[11]   However, in the passage on the *lexis graphikê* and *lexis agônistikê* he does to a certain extent pair off the kinds of style with psychological qualities.   The *lexis graphikê* is the most precise style (*akribestatê*).   It is to be used in compositions designed for a careful reading with the book in the hands (*en chersin*). Presumably this style appeals mainly to the intelligence; it is used in forensic oratory more than in the deliberative kind (ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα) since one is speaking to a single undistracted judge whose mind is clear (καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις).   The *lexis agônistikê* has two aspects: the *êthikê* and the *pathêtikê*.   This is the style of plays that are written for a full performance on the stage as opposed to those designed for a reading [12]; it is also used in deliberative oratory.   In both of these it is important to play upon the emotions as well as to delineate character.

   In the same passage, however, Aristotle goes beyond the suggestion of psychological affinities between the style and the audience. He is more concerned with what the styles can do than with their passive qualities.[13]   The *ergon* of the *lexis graphikê* is *anagnôsis* ("a reading") [14] rather than a full performance employing delivery on a grand scale.   The *lexis agônistikê* is described as *hypokritikôtatê*, and its *ergon* is delivery (*hypokrisis*).[14]   The styles

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[11] He uses the standard classification of speeches, deliberative, forensic and epideictic in 1358B–1369B, 1414A–1417B.

[12] I translate *anagnôsis* "a reading" to avoid the notion of silent comprehension which is usually conveyed by the current use of the word "reading."   Cf. δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό (*Rhet*. 1407B11 f.).   Concerning the fact that the ancients customarily read orally, "eine vielleicht wenigen bekannte Tatsache," see Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* 6 and "Nachträge," pages 1–2.

[13] Plato had demanded an account of the *pathêmata logôn* (above, note 10). Aristotle emphasizes in this passage the *erga* (*poiêmata*) or "active functions."

[14] The exact difference between *anagnôsis* and *hypokrisis* would be difficult to define; see above, note 12; cf. *distinctio* vs. *pronuntiatio* in Maurice P. Cunningham, "Some Phonetic Aspects of Word Order Patterns in Latin," *PAPS* 101 (1957) 503, cf. 494, 497 f.

are a pair of ideal classifications; he recognizes a relative scale between them, along which, presumably, the two could be mixed together in varying degrees: "Where there is the most scope for delivery, there is the least precision (*akribeia*) of style."   Aristotle tells us that the more carefully something is written, the better it is suited to a reading without full delivery.   It does not follow that something written for full delivery is always carelessly written. On the contrary, in accordance with the *ergon* of the *lexis agônistikê* some very definite stylistic techniques, such as the repetition of the same word, are used as vehicles for delivery (ὡς προοδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑπο-κρίνεσθαι, 1413в22 f.).

So far we have discussed the relationship in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* of style and delivery, and some mention has been made of their psychological affinities.   It will be necessary now to go behind these things into the influence from Plato and from the older times before rhetoric had been established by anyone as a *technê*. In Aristotle's treatment of delivery after he has said that delivery is *entechnon* with regard to style (see above, page 259), he continues as follows:

> For this reason actors with histrionic ability also win prizes in their turn, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches (*graphomenoi logoi*) owe their effectiveness more to the expression than to the thought (1404в18–19).

There seems at first sight to be no obvious reason for using the word *graphomenoi*.   Surely the suggestion of Cope-Sandys (*ad. loc.*) that the *epideiktikon genos* is meant cannot be correct unless Aristotle is inconsistent.   Epideictic in the *lexis graphikê* is the most accurately written of the three kinds of discourse and depends the least upon delivery, the counterpart of style, for its effectiveness (see above, page 260).   The technical term *lexis graphikê* must not be confused with *graphomenos logos*, which means "a speech that is written down."   Speeches in the *lexis agônistikê* can also be *graphomenoi*.   But why does Aristotle scruple to use this word at all?   Recall that Plato in the *Phaedrus* had had some rather hard things to say of the speech that is "written down" (*gegrammenos logos* 277D ff.).   Plato's strictures on writing are well known, while Aristotle nowhere speaks in disparagement of it.[15]   It is

[15] See W. Rhys Roberts, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (New York 1928) 54–5; cf. Arist. *Soph. elen.* 1836в–1846; see James A. Notopoulos, "Mnemosyne in Oral Literature," *TAPA* 69 (1938) 476–85; W. C. Greene, "The Spoken and the Written Word," *HSCP* 60 (1951) 23–24, 45–52.

indeed worth noting that Plato did write his dialogues and that
Aristotle published less during his maturity as he did more oral
teaching; thus Plato and Aristotle seem in a paradoxical way to
agree to a certain extent on the question of the value of writing.[16]
However, in respect to rhetoric as a *techné* they are found, I think,
in disagreement. Professor James A. Notopoulos[17] has given a
pertinent analysis of the background for Plato's disapproving the
invention of writing. He shows evidence of the struggle that took
place in the transition from oral literature of the Homeric type to
literature that was committed to writing. There was a strong
prejudice against "the encroachment of the written word upon
the spoken word" partly because the use of writing tended to
destroy the memory, which was valued highly among the ancient
oral peoples. The prejudice against writing is seen in several
places in ancient literature and is reflected in the myth of Theuth
and Thamus, which Plato playfully adapts to his argument on
writing in the Phaedrus (274E–275A). Theuth, a "culture hero"
like Prometheus, had discovered numbers, arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy and letters. He boasts to Thamus, King of Egypt, that
his invention of letters will aid the memory of the Egyptians and
make them wiser. Theuth replies that letters will do just the
opposite because people who use them will not practise their
memory and will become forgetful; writing will improve not
memory (*mnêmê*), but reminding (*hypomnêsis*). Notopoulos shows
that Plato while opposing the use of the written word advocates a
certain kind of memory, "not the memory of the written word,
which is simply a static and retentive memory, but the creative
memory or oral literature." Notopoulos demonstrates that
memory is used in ancient oral poetry of the pregraphic era as a
means in the process of oral composition. Including in his argu-
ment the evidence of Milman Parry's computations of the num-
ber and frequency of formulas in the Homeric poems, he points
out that the oral poet memorized a vast and complex system of
formulas in order to compose orally. "There is no place for
passive memory in this technique, for the formulas vary in length
and are fused together in the very heat of oral recitation." A
slight qualification is needed here as to the distinction between
composition by oral memory and by written memory. Homer

16 Cf. Greene (above, note 15) 50, 52; Jaeger, *Aristotle* 317.
17 Notopoulos (above, note 15) 471–76

and other oral poets may have used writing as notes or *hypomnêmata*, in planning the general direction of a poem.[17a]   Conversely while the orators trained in rhetoric relied primarily on mnemonic systems for the purpose of "passive" or retentive memory, yet their memorization of commonplaces for use in extempore speaking has a slight similarity to the memorization and use of formulas in oral composition.   This may dull the edges of the distinction, but it seems to have been none the less a valid one for Plato who advocates a relatively active kind of memory, used creatively in oral composition, rather than the written memory of books.   He tells us that the written word is only "an image of the living and breathing word of the philosopher" (*Phaedrus* 276A).   This conviction is a "reappearance in Plato's philosophy of the old conflict between memory and letters."   The oral dialectician such as Socrates must, like the poet of earlier times, compose with the aid of oral memory.   Since Plato had postulated an art of rhetoric based on dialectic and had criticized the "written" aspect of speech making, it is highly improbable that Aristotle would have ignored him on a matter so essential to dialectic.   It is, therefore, possible to think that Aristotle in this passage mentions the dependence of "written speeches" upon style and delivery not in reference to epideictic oratory which he has not been talking about, but as a subtle answer to Plato on a matter essential to the whole art of rhetoric.   If so, it is as if Aristotle were saying that written speeches must differ from oral dialectic for they properly "derive their power (*ischyousi*) from the expression more than from the thought (1404A19)."

Plato in the *Phaedrus* and Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* both want an art of rhetoric based on dialectic; for Aristotle, however, the correspondence between the two arts was close, but not exact (ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (1354A1)).[18]   In the oral composition advocated by Plato the creative use of oral memory makes composition and performance identical, i.e., the oral poet or the dialectician speaks his thoughts to his listeners directly from the workings of his memory without advance preparation held in writing or in the retentive memory.   It is in this sense that Plato speaks of "the living and breathing word of the philosopher."   How was the orator of the era of the merely

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[17a] Cf. Greene (above, note 15) 31.
[18] See Cope–Sandys *ad. loc.*

retentive memory to match oral dialectic in liveliness and spon-
taneity?   Aristotle may already have answered this in part when
he spoke of the *graphomenoi logoi*, i.e., through attention to style and
its counterpart, delivery, in "written speeches" which depend for
their effect upon the expression more than the sense.   This will
be discussed more fully below where it will be seen that Aristotle
perceived a vital power in "written" composition that was
especially suitable to the art of rhetoric, in which style and
delivery were more important than in dialectic.   First, however,
let us ask just how much prominence "the expression" has over
"the thought" in Aristotle's theory of the two styles.   For Plato
states his objection to the written speech in other terms as well as
those mentioned above.   He says that writing is like a painting
of living creatures (*zôgraphia*); the creatures stand in the painting
as if alive, but if one asks them a question, they maintain a solemn
silence.   It is the same with the written word; the audience has
no chance to ask questions (*Phaedrus* 275D).   Written words can-
not defend themselves by argument and cannot adequately convey
the truth (276c).   This leads to the question why did Aristotle
choose *graphikê* as the technical term for the "most accurate style,"
whose function is "a reading"?   He may have been thinking of
Plato's objection to the *logos gegrammenos* since *graphikê* pertains to
the care taken in the *writing* (cf. *graphein*, 1413B8).   At the same
time he may have intended to echo Plato's comparison of the
written speech with painting, in which Plato plays with the words
graphê, "writing," and *zôgraphia*, "painting" (see above); for
graphikê sometimes refers also to painting (e.g. *Rhet.* 1371B6, cf.
Plato *Gorg.* 450c), and it is altogether possible that Aristotle is
taking advantage of the ambivalence of "graph" in the same way
as Plato.   If so, Aristotle would seem to be replying to Plato that
instead of defending itself by argument a written speech can
employ the accuracy (*akribeia*) of the *lexis graphikê* and make
unnecessary any further clarification by question and answer.
We may support this interpretation by noting in the same passage
an unmistakable comparison between a speech and painting.
Deliberative oratory, which is in the *lexis agônistikê*, is compared
not to *zôgraphia* ("painting from life, realistic painting") but to
skiagraphia ("painting in outline, rough sketch").   Aristotle's
basis of comparison is not that both "skiagraphic" painting and
deliberative oratory are lifeless and unable to respond to questions,

but that both achieve their effect from a distance where too much attention to close details would be wasted (1414A7–10). If Aristotle is making a retort to Plato as the echoes of thought and words suggest, Aristotle implies that it is not proper to demand the dialectical method of question and answer in this style of speaking. The function, *hypokrisis*, of the *lexis agônistikê* is such that the orator in a sense can only "answer," as if in reply to his audience who have not literally asked any questions. However, it will be seen that in the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition it is *hypokrisis* itself that produces in effect the same identity of composition and performance which was produced by the "living and breathing word" of oral memory. So far we have suggested only that in developing a *technê* of rhetoric which depends on invention, arrangement, style and delivery, all conjured in the labors of writing itself, Aristotle draws respectability to rhetoric from a quarter which Plato had disparaged.

Plato also disparages in some ways the part played in utterance by the operation of divine inspiration.[19] Miss Alice Sperduti[20] has traced the history of the ancient belief in divinity as the source of literary inspiration from its origin in mythological evidence; she shows how this belief emerged in the historical period in connection with the divine *enthousiasmos* of manticism and the divine mission of the poet in the community. A key aspect of divine inspiration was its association with the emotional state of mantic frenzy. Plato shows his distrust of this in the *Phaedrus* as well as in the *Ion*; he views it largely as a state of separation from *logos*.[21] It is with this in mind that he makes fun of Phaedrus' apparently inspired reading of Lysias' speech when Socrates begins his criticism of Lysias' *rhetorikon* (*Phaedrus* 234D f.). To Aristotle, however, in his discussion of *to prepon* inspired discourse depends on τὸ . . . εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι (*Rhet.* 1408A36–B20). An orator may use the techniques of a certain exaggerated style when he "has" his audience and they are filled with "enthusiasm." The style of orators who are *enthousiazontes* "is also appropriate to poetry, for poetry is an inspired thing (*entheon*)." A

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[19] E.g. *Phaedrus* 234D f., 245A; cf. *ibid*. 238D, 241E which probably are the passages referred to by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1408B19 f., as being in the "enthusiastic" style μετ' εἰρωνείας. Cf. *Ion*; e.g., ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν (534C).

[20] Alice Sperduti, "The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity," *TAPA* 81 (1950) 209–40.

[21] Cf. Sperduti (above, note 20) 238.

comparison between the divine ecstasy of the poet and the orator's feeling the emotions which he wishes to arouse in his audience persists in the later rhetorical tradition; all the examples of this that I have found pertain largely to the manner of delivery.[22] This perhaps was to be expected since Aristotle fixed delivery as an aspect of rhetoric which is directly linked with the emotions. "Delivery is a matter of how to use the voice for each particular emotion (*pros hekaston pathos*, 1403B26 f.)." It must be noted that in linking delivery specifically with *pathos* Aristotle does not mean to exclude *éthos* and logical argument. He indicates the connection between delivery and *éthos* and *pathos* when he says that the *lexis hypokritkôtatê* comprises the *éthikê* and the *pathêtikê* (see above, page 260). It appears that logical argument also has some need for delivery (διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν (1404A10)). Aristotle would include the expression of cold fact as a possible use of delivery, he would definitely add the expression of character, but apparently he observed that delivery is particularly adapted to the expression of feeling. In accordance with the doctrine of *to prepon*, mentioned above, delivery as well as style would express logical argument, *éthos*, or *pathos*, giving more prominence to one or the other as the occasion required. For example, at the appropriate moment an orator might depart so far from logical thought as to speak from inspiration. Aristotle may have discussed the subject of inspiration in the rhetorical art more fully with his students.[23] In regard to this possibility, since we have soon to mention Aristotle's most productive student, it seems pertinent to note that Aristotle changed his name from Tyrtamus to Theophrastus, a name compounded of *theos* and *phrazô* (Diog. Laert. 5.38). However, the point has been made that at least from Plato's time divine inspiration began to be associated in a technical way with the emotional feeling and expression of the orator. If it can be assumed that rhetoric

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[22] Ne hoc in nobis (oratoribus) mirum esse videatur, quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scaena, quam fabulae? ... Si ... histrio, cotidie cum (versus ex tragoedia Pacuvii) ageret, tamen agere sine dolore non poterat, quid Pacuvium putatis in scribendo leni animo ac remisso fuisse? Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse, et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris. Cic. *De or.* 2.193 f.; cf. furiosissime, Sen. *Contr.* 10.5.21; phrenetici, *ibid.* 27; see esp. plena deo, Sen. *Suas.* 3, 6; cf. Kroll, "Rhetorik," *RE* Supplementband 7.1076.26–46.

[23] For *enthousiasmos* as an emotion in the soul and as subject to purgation along with pity and fear, see *Pol.* 1340A2–12, 1342A6–11.

absorbed more influences than those of a linear history of *technai* going back to Corax and Tisias, one may suggest that some of the elements of inspiration with its frenzied glances, tones, rhythms, postures, emotions were taken over from the more ancient development into rhetoric; that these elements were caught and preserved by Aristotle and others in the *techné*, especially under the headings of the emotions and delivery.

Aristotle did not work out a theory of delivery in detail; he left this to Theophrastus.[24]   In a way, however, Aristotle had done the ground work.   In his famous analysis of *pathé* (*Rhet.* 1378A31–1388B30) and *ethé* (1388B31–1391B7) he carefully defines each emotion and the types of character and gives shrewd psychological observations in a methodical way.   Professor Friedrich Solmsen has gathered considerable evidence tending to show that no rhetorician from a time after Aristotle, until Cicero, discussed the emotions and character as a primary subject of rhetoric.[25]   On the other hand Theophrastus expanded the technical material on delivery, the external expression of the emotions and character. It is difficult to say why the treatment of the emotions and of character dropped out of rhetorical theory.   It has been suggested that the Stoics influenced the later systems of rhetoric in this way, especially through Hermagoras, with their disapproval of arousing the emotions.[26]   It is possible too that there was a practical reason. When Aristotle wrote his detailed analysis of *éthé* and *pathé*, he carried out Plato's suggestion that an orator must have an understanding of the *psyché*.   After that had been done, the orator presumably, in order to master his art, also needed to know the outward signs (*signa, charactéres*) of the inward motions (*kinésis tês psychês*) with which Aristotle had been concerned.   He himself had supplied the hint that delivery should be used *pros hekaston pathos* and that the *lexis hypokritikótaté* (*agônistiké*) consisted of the *éthiké* and the *pathétiké*.

If Stoicism influenced the destiny of the rhetorical theory of emotions, some influence may have come from the Stoic view of the natural source of emotional expression in the *psyché*.   According

[24] See Kroll (above, note 22) 1075, 23–50; Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Leipzig 1912) 70 f.; Maximilian Schmidt, *Commentatio de Theophrasto rhetore* (Halle 1839) 61.

[25] Solmsen (above, note 10) 394–96; Solmsen (above, note 7), 178.   Cicero treats the *affectus* in *De. or* 2.48.185–52.211; see below (pages 268–69).

[26] Solmsen (above, note 7) 178.

to this view the thoughts and emotions which originated with-
in the *psyche* through the *logos endiathetos* were expressed by means
of the *logos prophorikos*. The Stoics defined the *logos prophorikos*
as φωνὴ διὰ γλώττης σημαντικὴ τῶν ἔνδον καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν παθῶν
(Porphyr. *De abstin.* 3.3).[27] It is possible to consider this
conception as the background against which a shift of emphasis in
rhetorical studies took place. Plato and Aristotle emphasized
"psychology," but Aristotle prepared the way to the study of the
outward expressions of the *psyche* by briefly incorporating delivery
into rhetoric. Theophrastus expanded delivery, and the Stoics
followed him by including delivery in their rhetorical scheme
(Diog. Laert. 7.43). Theophrastus himself may have begun to
bring the theory of delivery into harmony with Aristotle's whole
analysis of the emotions, but is difficult to say just what Theo-
phrastus contributed in this way since we do not know to what
extent Cicero and others who wrote on delivery are indebted to
him.[28] At any rate as the amount of material on the techniques
of delivery increased, the orators may have gained some practical
benefit from this new emphasis even at the expense of neglecting
somewhat the study of the emotions which ought to accompany
delivery. However, the Hellenistic rhetoricians apparently
developed more and more rules of delivery; the pedantic nature
of their endless divisions of the kinds of delivery is reflected in a
long passage of the *Ad Herennium* (3.23–27).[29] As they continued
to neglect the Aristotelian tradition of the knowledge of the
emotions, they seem at the same time to have enfeebled the theory
of delivery.

It remained for Cicero to go back to the *ratio Aristotelia* and to

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[27] Cf. Horace, *Ars poetica* 108–11:

> format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
> fortunarum habitum; iuvat aut impellit ad iram
> aut ad humum maerore gravi deducit et angit;
> post effert animi motus interprete lingua.

See Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.*; cf. G. C. Fiske and M. A. Grant, *Cicero's De oratore and Horace's Ars Poetica* (Madison [Wis.] 1929) 113.

[28] Cf. Athanasius, *Proleg. rhet.* (*ca.* saec. IV): Θεόφραστος ... φησὶν εἶναι μέγιστον ῥητορικῇ πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀναφέρων καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων, ὡς καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ ἐπιστήμῃ σύμφωνον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸν τόνον τῆς ψυχῆς (Walz, vol. 6, 35 f.). Cf. also Kroll (above, note 22) 1075.34–43; Solmsen (above, note 7) 45 f.; H. Caplan, *Rhet. ad Herennium* 191, note b; H. Rabe, *Proleg. syll.* 177.

[29] Cf. H. Caplan (above, note 28) 194, note c; Kroll (above, note 22) 1075.48–50.

apply his own talents to rhetoric. Aristotle had divided *inventio* into three kinds of "proofs": *apodeixis, êthos, pathos.* Cicero in the *De oratore* is the first author known to have returned to this scheme.[30] He does not discuss exactly the same subject as Aristotle did under *êthos*; for Cicero this is not the speaker's character but the *leniores affectus*, a lesser degree of *pathos.*[31] But by following Aristotle's tripartite division as a pattern he restores to the theory of the emotions the same degree of prominence as in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is also important to notice how Cicero's approach to the subject of the emotions differs from Aristotle's.[32] Aristotle defines and describes *êthê* and *pathê* in themselves so as to give the knowledge needed by the orator for finding his means of persuasion. Cicero does less of this; instead he includes information on the external techniques to be used. He stresses the *signa* of the *leniores affectus* and recommends the proper tone of voice, facial expression, language and a certain technique of delivery whereby the orator can give the impression of being under involuntary compulsion when his attack is too vehement (*De or.* 2.182). Cicero assumes that the orator must have a knowledge of the stronger emotions as well as the techniques of arousing them, for he thinks the orator must himself feel the emotions of his speech in order to impart them to his audience (2.189). This would not necessarily call for a systematic knowledge but at least for an empirical knowledge. Even here, however, as one might expect, Cicero again includes the visible signs of the emotions: e.g. . . . *neque ad misericordiam adduceretur (iudex), nisi tu ei signa doloris tui verbis, sententiis, voce, vultu, collacrimatione . . . ostenderis* (2.190).

Even if we had no evidence of a traditional connection between the emotions and delivery, it would not be surprising to find that Cicero discusses them together; for he tells us that content and form are not separable and that eloquence is a unity no matter how it may be divided into chapters for purposes of discussion (*De or.* 3.19–24, 37; cf. *Orator* 61). Accordingly in the chapter on style in the *De oratore* we find that one of the most important

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[30] Solmsen (above, note 10) 398.

[31] L. Voit, *Deinotês, Ein antiker Stilbegriff* (Leipzig 1934) 135–40. Cf. Quint. *Inst. orat.* 6.2.9.

[32] The most noticeable correspondences between the two treatments in the *De oratore* and the *Rhetoric* are those between 2.206 and 1380в35 ff. and between 2.211 and 1385в13 ff. Cf. Solmsen (above, note 10) 397.

principles is discussed in terms of delivery. Crassus illustrates the avoidance of *satietas* in the grand style by describing the delivery of Roscius and Aesopus of some lines of tragedy (3.98–103). At the end of the chapter on the techniques of style Cicero reminds us that style and delivery are traditionally (see above, page 259) associated under the single rubric of "how" to speak: *Haec omnia perinde sunt ut aguntur* (3.213). He then proceeds in the chapter on delivery to show how delivery in turn is bound to the emotions (3.216). In the *Orator* he states the relationship of delivery, style and emotions in a brief passage which could almost stand as a summary of the three as treated in the *De oratore* (*Orator* 55):

> Quo modo ... dicatur, id est in duobus: in agendo et in eloquendo ... Vocis mutationes totidem sunt quot animorum ... Perfectus (orator) ... utcumque se affectum videri et animum audientis moveri volet, ita certum vocis admovebit sonum.

This passage will serve in turn to introduce the next subject of this paper. Cicero seems to be saying something similar to Aristotle's πῶς (φωνῇ) δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος (see above, page 266). It may seem difficult to believe that Cicero means a "fixed" (*certum*, "predetermined") tone of voice for each emotion, for this would imply that an author creates the delivery of a speech while in the actual process of composing the language. At this point in the argument we might accept this interpretation as a factual statement of a principle in the Aristotelian tradition, but we are fortunate in having the additional assurance of Cicero's fuller treatment of delivery in the *De oratore* (3.213–27). Here he says, "Nature has assigned to every emotion its own particular facial expression, tone of voice and gesture."[33] He describes the operation of this principle only in the voice but implies that facial expression and gesture operate in the same way (cf. 3.220 ff.). By "nature" Cicero does not mean *sine arte*, but *natura ab arte perfecta*.[34] Nature and training in the art of delivery together produce and establish a *genus vocis* for each emotion (3.215 f.).

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[33] Omnis enim motus animi suum quendam a natura habet voltum et sonum et gestum (*De or.* 3.216). Cf. Philod. 1.196.8.

[34] Cf. .... sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas, sed ea si satis in actione efficeret ipsa per sese, arte profecto non egeremus; verum quia animi permotio ... perturbata saepe ita est ut obscuretur, ... discutienda sunt ea, quae obscurant, et ea, quae sunt eminentia et prompta, sumenda (3.215). For Cicero's conception of *natura ab arte perfecta* see Fiske and Grant (above, note 27) 83 f.

There are of course many things which we do not know about Cicero's terminology of the voice and about certain phonetic aspects of the Latin language,[35] but Cicero explains very plainly the principle of the general tones that are fixed in the voice. Another author might well express his despair of trying to portray the use of the voice in writing (e.g. the author of the *Ad Herennium* 3.27), but Cicero uses the term *genera vocis* in an illuminating comparison with the strings of a lyre.[36]   The sounds of the voice are fixed by nature and by the control of art in the same way as the strings of a lyre are set in tune.   The sounds of the voice express emotions in the same way as the strings of the lyre respond to the touch.   Different emotional impulses (touches) activate different sounds of the voice (strings).   The sounds referred to are the various qualities of the voice (strings).   Each quality consists of a range of sounds which is defined by its two extremes (*acuta-gravis, cita-tarda, magna-parva*); between each pair of extremes there is a medium sound.   Each quality so defined is a *genus vocis*. From combinations of the three basic qualities (*acuta–gravis*, etc.) other qualities are derived.   Cicero then leaves the comparison with the lyre and takes up the emotions with a description of the *genera vocis* which are bound to each emotion: *iracundia, miseratio ac moeror, metus, vis, voluptas, molestia*.   For Cicero each one of these is a separate, well-differentiated *motus animi*.[37]   Each *genus vocis* is correspondingly defined in exact terms (3.217–19).   In the chapter on the emotions Cicero compares the orator's ability to feel for himself the emotions of his speech with the way in which the actor feels the emotions of his role and with the way in which the poet was "inspired" with them when he wrote the play (*in scribendo*, 2.193 f.).   In the present passage he gives the techniques to be used to insure a sharp expression of the emotional

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[35] But see Cunningham (above, note 14) 481–505.

[36] . . . totumque corpus hominis et eius omnis vultus omnesque voces, ut nervi in fidibus, ita sonant ut a motu animi quoque sunt pulsae.   Nam voces ut chordae sunt intentae quae ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta gravis, cita tarda, magna parva, quas tamen inter omnes est suo quaeque in genere mediocris; atque etiam illa sunt ab his delapsa plura genera, lene asperum, contractum diffusum, continenti spiritu intermisso, fractum scissum, flexo sono attenuatum inflatum (*De or.* 3.216).

[37] See quotation above, note 34.   Cicero deliberately casts out anything which might blur the distinctions between separate emotions.   Today there is often the opposite tendency to lump the whole gamut of human feelings obscurely into two vague groups; in general people say they are either "feeling good/happy" or "depressed."

content of a speech.   The assumption of Cicero is that before the
speech is delivered to an audience the *genera vocis* are already as
much a part of the speech as the written words.   It is on the basis
of this assumption that he is able to illustrate the *genera vocis* as he
does with quotations from dramatic poetry.   There is nothing
unusual about using quotations in this way; e.g. Aristotle quoted
dramatic poetry to show the stylistic devices in the *lexis hypokriti-
kôtatê* (*agônistikê*) which require certain kinds of delivery (*Rhet.*
1413B21–1414A7, see above, page 261).   Similarly Cicero probably
means to demonstrate each *genus vocis* not only with the meaning
of the quotations but also with the style in which they were
written.[38]

It remains only to strengthen the argument of this paper by
adding the support of a few passages on delivery in Quintilian,
whose dependence upon the rhetorical writings of Cicero is
conspicuous and well known.[39]   Quintilian   too   stresses   the
connection between the emotions and delivery (*Inst. orat.* 11.3.61
f.); he clearly includes *êthê* and *pathê* within the province of
delivery (*commendatione morum, qui . . . ex voce . . . atque actione
pellucent,* 11.3.154; *movendi . . . ratio aut in repraesentandis est aut
imitandis affectibus, ibid.* 156).   Cicero had said that if the orator
did not readily feel for himself the emotions of his speech, some
higher kind of art (*maior ars*) would perhaps be required (*De or.*
2.189).   Quintilian supplies this art; he suggests that one can
kindle his own emotions by calling to mind *phantasiai* or *visiones,*
images of the facts of a case; such *visiones* are involved in dreams
and cause the poet to write vividly (6.2.29–33).   He recommends
this for effective delivery when the proper emotion does not come
of its own accord (11.3.62).   In discussing the causes of some
faults of delivery Quintilian quite incidentally makes a revealing
remark concerning the operation of delivery in the actual process
of composing a speech.   He finds that a fault of delivery derives
from the existence of certain subtle stresses in language which are
like metrical feet; most people gesture on these stresses; the fault

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[38] Although the terms used by Cicero to describe each *genus vocis* are specifically
applied to delivery in this passage, Cicero and others apply the same terms and their
kind to style (*genera dicendi*) as well.   See Charles Henderson, Jr., *A Lexicon of the
Stylistic Terms Used in Roman Literary Criticism* (Diss., Chapel Hill [N.C.] 1954) *passim.*
On the intimate connection of delivery with word order see Cunningham (above,
note 14) 481–505.

[39] See Kroll (above, note 22) 1105.14–24.

is that when young orators write and when they plan their gestures by meditating (*cum scribunt gestum praemodulati cogitatione*), they compose their speeches according to the way the hand falls on these subtle stresses (11.3.108 f.). Other writers probably take for granted the activity of delivery in the process of composition. It is fortunate that Quintilian mentions this, even if incidentally. Whatever was John Bulwer's immediate source, we now have further confirmation of the existence of ancient precedents for his statement, "The gestures of the *Hand* must be prepar'd in the Mind, together with the inward speech, that precedes the outward expression."

In this paper we have examined evidence concerning the interpenetration of delivery and literary composition in ancient rhetorical theory. Since this evidence comes largely from rhetorical manuals, the conclusions pertain in the first place to oratory itself, but they could be extended to all forms of literature in the same way as the rhetoricians themselves include other forms of literature in their analyses of style and delivery. The scope of this paper has been restricted to the development of ancient rhetorical theory itself and to some influences that worked upon it. The extensions that can be made to ancient literature in practice will have to be the subject of further research. On the basis of the evidence pertaining to theory, however, this conclusion may be advanced, that in the Aristotelian tradition, which includes the Theophrastan and the Ciceronian, the techniques of delivery are not merely something that is added in a superficial way after the process of literary composition has been completed, but something that is vitally involved in the very labors of composition anticipating the public presentation. As evidence of this the theoretical interpenetrations of delivery, style and the emotions have been examined in the rhetorical tradition. It was suggested in addition that the history of ancient literature before the invention and/or extensive use of writing and before the technical study of rhetoric made this important aspect of delivery inevitable. From the ancient quarrel of philosophy and rhetoric, in the form it took between Plato and Aristotle, evidence was selected tending to show that the rhetorical delivery of the written speech competed in a certain way with the spontaneously vivid manner of oral composition; it was also shown that rhetorical delivery in the Aristotelian tradition lays claim to something resembling divine inspiration. The

beginnings of all these things are found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* Some inferences were drawn as to the uncertain period from Aristotle to the author of the *Ad Herennium,* chiefly that the theory of delivery suffered from the absence of the Aristotelian way of studying the emotions. Cicero revived the study of the emotions and gave new life to the theory of delivery. His explanation of the *genera vocis* shows most clearly how delivery expresses the emotions and how it is involved in composition so as to anticipate the public presentation. Certain passages of Quintilian serve to confirm these conclusions.